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Care Worker Migration and the Responsibility for Rectifying Injustice
Jordan Desmond

Abstract: Contemporary patterns of care worker migration have given rise to structural injustices for both
the states from which such workers tend to migrate and the care workers themselves. In this paper, I critically
examine an account of assigning rectificatory responsibility for these injustices offered by Eckenwiler and
suggest that, though there is considerable insight to be gleaned from the account, its acute focus on two
particular sorts of responsibility-generating relationships limits is efficacy. In response, I propose a model of
assigning rectificatory responsibility that focuses on the opportunities or aid that all sorts of relationships to
injustice generate.
Bio: Jordan Desmond is a doctoral student in philosophy at Queen’s University, Kingston.
Keywords: care worker migration, Lisa Eckenwiler, rectificatory injustice, rectificatory responsibility,
transnational justice.

Health workers are migrating at “unprecedented rates” from low-income countries with
low supplies of health workers to higher income destinations.1 Among those migrating are care
workers such as nurses and direct care workers (DCWs).2 These workers are of vital importance
to health care provision, given their status as the “principal providers of basic health services.”3
As such, global disparities and shortages in care workers are liable to undermine significantly
public health efforts in the low-income countries from which they tend to emigrate. Complicating
matters is the fact that these patterns of migration are often accompanied by considerable injustices
to both states and individuals that have been shaped by the social, political, and economic
structures in which these acts of migration are embedded. Efforts to identify which agents might
be responsible for rectifying these ‘structural’ injustices must therefore untangle a complex web
of international interaction occurring among states, non-government organizations, and
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individuals. What is needed is a framework through which we can identify the litany of moral
considerations, such as economic and political power, geographic proximity, and epistemic
privilege, in light of which such actors might be said to possess obligations of rectificatory action.
In “Care Worker Migration and Transnational Justice,” Lisa Eckenwiler presents a
comprehensive account of the various injustices involved in mass care worker migration, traces
their social, political and economic causes, and sketches a brief but promising picture of how we
might go about assigning rectificatory responsibility for them.4 In the following, I critically
examine Eckenwiler’s model and argue on behalf of an approach to attributing responsibility that
focuses on opportunities for effective moral action. I will begin in Section I by providing a brief
outline of the sorts of injustices Eckenwiler identifies as occurring as a result of the care worker
migration crisis. In Section II, I examine and defend the guiding principles of her account of
transnational justice. In Section III, I will argue that the more particular attributions Eckenwiler
makes entail limitations in scope and motivational capacity that undermine the potential efficacy
of the account. In Section IV, I provide a rough outline of an opportunity-focused approach to
attributing rectificatory responsibility and argue that it is offers a more promising model while
retaining the key contributions of Eckenwiler’s account.
I
As Eckenwiler rightly notes, the structural injustices endemic to the care worker migration
crisis are manifold. Existing global health disparities continue to be exacerbated due to the
tendency for migrant care workers to emigrate away from low-income countries in the global
South.5 Many countries in the global South are therefore facing significant shortages in DCWs that
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impose considerable strain on systems of public health provision.6 Additionally, migrant workers
themselves face enormous challenges, including feelings of dislocation, lower-tier jobs with lower
wages, insufficient health insurance and, in some cases, restrictions on their ability to travel freely
and visit home.7 To make matters worse, undocumented workers, who are now coming to make
up a greater and greater percentage of direct care workers in high income countries, face the
additional threat of deportation.8
Giving rise to many of these challenges is the fact that, as immigrants, migrant care workers
tend to possess diminished bargaining power in their labour relations and are thereby vulnerable
to exploitative practices by their employers without sufficient protection or advocacy.9 These
injustices are further compounded by the fact that migrant care workers tend overwhelmingly to
be women. Often, gender norms and cultural stereotypes work to undermine the autonomy of
women in these positions.10 For instance, the perception of women from the global South as
“caring, obedient and meticulous workers” constrains the types of work they will have access to
in destination countries. In addition, women are often unlikely to have a say in how their
remittances to home get spent.11
Thus, not only does the broader issue of global disparity in the level of health services exist,
but mass care worker migration carries additional structural injustices to the autonomy and
working conditions of workers themselves that are in desperate need of rectification. Let us now
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turn to a promising framework through which we might assign responsibility for these rectificatory
efforts.
II
Eckenwiler argues that the most convincing accounts of transnational justice will (1)
ground our responsibilities in our connections to those who perpetuate and suffer from injustice
and (2) conceptualize responsibility for rectifying a structural injustice as distinct from blame for
past wrongdoing.12 In this section, I will examine each of these principles and suggest that they
comprise necessary components of a plausible framework for attributing responsibility for
structural injustice.
The first principle emphasizes the necessity of framing approaches to attributing
responsibility in cases of structural injustice as relational or role-based.13 Non-relation
transnational accounts of responsibility, such as those that focus on our common humanity, fail to
recognize the importance of the structural and institutional nature of relationships at the global
level and thus lack the nuance necessary to assess responsibility adequately in these cases.14 An
important implication of the structural approach is that rectificatory efforts can focus on the nature
of one’s connections to injustice and the particular opportunities for moral action which they
afford.15 Not all agents will possess the same opportunities for moral action. For instance, states
to which we have assigned responsibility will possess drastically different opportunities to rectify
the structural injustices of the care worker migration crisis from the NGOs and particular
individuals residing in these states because each is connected to the injustice in a different way. If
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an account of global justice fails to pay adequate attention to the diversity of these connections, it
will fail to grasp the particularity of our opportunities for moral action. Appropriately assigning
responsibility to rectify structural injustices will thus necessitate a constant reflection on these
connections and the opportunities they afford.
The second principle of Eckenwiler’s account focuses on the necessity of
“conceptualiz[ing] moral and political responsibility as distinct from blame for past wrongs.”16
This seems to trace a distinction drawn by Claudia Card, who argues that we must distinguish
between

“forward-looking”

and

“backward-looking”

accounts

of

attributing

moral

responsibility.17 Backward-looking attributions of responsibility identify “what has been done”
and assess the extent to which we can be praised, blamed, punished or rewarded for our
contributory actions.18 While such attributions certainly account for a considerable amount of our
day-to-day attributions of responsibility, Eckenwiler rightly notes that it may prove
counterproductive to focus on attributing blame for structural injustice, given both the difficulty
of doing so and the fact that it is not obvious how doing so will serve rectificatory efforts. 19 A
more fruitful approach might then be to focus on forward-looking attributions.
Forward-looking attributions of responsibility typically point to positive obligations to
respond to a certain state of affairs in some way.20 In the context of injustice, then, we might
characterize forward-looking attributions of responsibility as attributing to some agent, or set of
agents, an obligation to rectify the injustice or contribute to rectificatory efforts. In doing so, we
sidestep the issue of tracing the complex causal contributions of various agents and actors and
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instead focus on how we might best approach the question of positive rectification. Attributions of
blame may no doubt prove important in other respects, but it is not clear an answer to this question
is necessary in order to identify who might be charged with forward-looking responsibility.
The principles identified above demonstrate the promise of Eckenwiler’s account. An
account of attributing responsibility that lacked these qualities would be considerably
impoverished in its efficacy. Nevertheless, there is reason to doubt that Eckenwiler’s account
offers an exhaustive picture of how we ought to go about attributing responsibility for rectifying
the structural injustices of care worker migration. In the next section, I will take up the question of
where this account may face limitations which undermine its promise.
III
Presumably, a virtue of a theory of forward-looking responsibility is that it is effective in
bringing about a desirable state of affairs. Thus, in matters of injustice, we should think a theory
of forward-looking responsibility is better, ceteris paribus, if it would more effectively bring about
circumstances of rectification. Two qualities of a such a theory that will be of importance to its
efficacy are the scope of agents identified as possessing responsibility and the motivational force
attributions of responsibility are likely to have for such agents. In other words, the scope of agents
identified ought to be sufficient to bring about comprehensive rectification and the motivational
force of the attributions ought to be sufficient to compel the identified agents to act in the ways
necessary to do so. With these criteria in mind, let us return to Eckenwiler’s account and the more
particular attributions it makes, and assess the extent to which they are satisfied.
Briefly, Eckenwiler identifies two sorts of agents to whom we ought to look in attributing
rectificatory responsibility for the care worker migration crisis: (i) those who benefit from the

6
CJPP, Volume 7, 2021

Case Worker Migration and the Responsibility for Rectifying Injustice

Jordan Desmond

injustice and (ii) those who “participate in the structures that contribute to injustice.”21 In order
to test the efficacy of the account, we should assess how attributions on the basis of these categories
fair in terms of scope and motivational force when applied to a particular proposal for rectification.
The idea is that if Eckenwiler’s account fails in these respects, then it will likely lack the sort of
efficacy we might desire from such an account. Thus, I will assess the extent to which Eckenwiler’s
account can attribute responsibility in a way that is sufficient to instantiate a particularly promising
proposal from Joan Tronto for addressing the more personal injustices done to migrant care
workers.22
Recall that many of the injustices faced by migrant care workers can be traced to their
status as immigrants, documented or undocumented, to destination countries. For instance, in
certain countries, when care workers “cease being useful as domestic servants they are subject to
immediate deportation.”23 Thus, the fact that their capacity to continue to live in a higher income
country depends on their being consistently employed lessens their bargaining power in
negotiations with employers and leaves them vulnerable to exploitative practices. Further, many
newly-arrived migrant workers are divorced from the political autonomy that comes with the
ability to participate in political institutions and this may present a barrier to having their interests
adequately reflected in the legislature or fostering a sense of belonging to the countries in which
they work. In contrast, citizenship of a state often affords one a sense of belonging that is
accompanied by a number of rights and protections that shield one from exploitative practices and
give one an avenue for recourse against harm and injustice. Given that societies tend to “conceive
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of citizens in terms of the contributions they make”24 and contemporary models of citizenship
understand paid labour to be a constitutive factor,25 Tronto thus proposes that we redefine
citizenship so as to confer upon immigrant care workers the status of citizen by virtue of the
invaluable contributions they make to the societies where they are employed.26 The issue that
concerns us here is determining how we can provoke such a change in the understanding of
citizenship through the assigning of responsibility.
While citizenship is in many respects a concrete political status, it is nevertheless a concept
grounded in a shared conception among members of given community.27 If there is no shift in
attitudes toward citizenship in the members of a community, it is unlikely that changes in concrete
legislation will ever occur. Thus, in order to carry out this sort of proposal, we require an account
of responsibility that both attributes to citizens a duty to reflect on their attitudes towards
citizenship and motivates them to carry out such a duty through collective political action. With
this in mind, let us assess Eckenwiler’s account.
In order to make an effective assessment, I will focus on what I take to be the broader of
Eckenwiler’s two attributions: the participatory attribution. The hope is that, should the broader of
the two attributions fail to effectively realize the proposed solution, then it should a fortiori cast
doubt on the one more constrained attribution. Nevertheless, such a conclusion is not of absolute
necessity to the broader argument being made in the paper. As I will later demonstrate, both the
participatory and benefit attributions are accommodated by the more expansive opportunityfocused approach
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Eckenwiler’s reference to “participat[ion] in the structures that contribute to injustice”28 as
a basis for responsibility seems to admit of a strict or a modest interpretation. Under the strict
interpretation, we might say agents participate in such structures only insofar as there exists a strict
causal relation between their actions and the instantiation or perpetuation of the structures.
However, if we interpret Eckenwiler’s position in the strict sense, not only will it be incredibly
difficult to determine who has played a causal role in bringing about the injustices in question,29
but it seems likely there will be a number of citizens who are excluded from any sort of forwardlooking responsibility. We can conceive of citizens who neither participate in, nor contribute to,
any of the injustices being done to immigrant care workers (at least in the sense of discrete,
recognizable causal contributions). If responsibility is attributed only “to the extent”30 that this is
the case, they will seemingly remain outside the scope of responsibility. This is problematic
particularly because, as noted, citizenship as a political construct relies on a shared conception of
what it means to be a citizen. In order to alter this shared conception, the responsibility to modify
one’s definition of citizenship cannot fall only on a select few who have causally contributed to an
injustice. The scope must be sufficiently inclusive so as to attribute this responsibility to the
citizens of a community taken as a whole (or close to it); otherwise, the change is unlikely to occur.
Admittedly, Eckenwiler likely intends the notion of participation to be interpreted in a
much looser sense. She writes that such a clause applies even if our participation or contribution
is unintentional or mediated over time.31 In this way, the scope of responsible agents is likely to
be much larger than it would be under the stricter interpretation. However, expanding the scope of
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responsible agents in this particular way seems to come at a cost to the motivational force of
attributions of responsibility. Specifically, we are unlikely to be able to motivate individuals to
take responsibility on the basis of contributions that are unrecognized, unintentional, or mediated
over time. By widening our interpretation of participation, we sacrifice the motivational force that
comes with pointing to clear-cut cases of contribution or participation in injustice and demanding
rectification. Instead, we rely on agents to motivate themselves to discharge duties on the basis of
participation they themselves are unlikely to recognize.
The problem, then, is that no matter how we interpret even Eckenwiler’s broader
suggestion for attributing responsibility, we seem to be left unable to sufficiently carry out what
would be a particularly effective way to respond to the structural injustices of care worker
migration. Either the scope is far too limited to carry out rectificatory actions effectively, or the
attributions will implicate agents in a way that fails to motivate them to carry out whatever duties
accompany the attribution. In the next section, I propose an opportunity-focused expansion of
Eckenwiler’s account that is intended to address these concerns.
IV
With the strengths and limitations of Eckenwiler’s account in mind, this section will
proceed in three steps. I will begin by outlining how the opportunity framework can accommodate
and explain both of the guiding principles upon which Eckenwiler’s position is based, and which
I argued constitute necessary conditions of a plausible account of transnational justice. I will then
demonstrate how the more particular attributions Eckenwiler makes can be accommodated by the
opportunity framework. Finally, I will argue that by approaching responsibility from the
perspective of opportunity to make effective contributions, we can extend the scope of responsible
agents in a way that generates more resources with which to respond to the injustices of the care
10
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worker migration crisis. To show this to be the case, I will return to Tronto’s proposal with the
opportunity framework in mind.
To begin, I will briefly note what I have in mind when I speak of the opportunity account,
though this will no doubt be fleshed out in greater detail as the section develops. The motivation
for the account is the idea I noted earlier that, ceteris paribus, we should desire an account of
transnational justice that maximizes effective responses to injustice. The opportunity framework
thus proceeds from the idea that if one possesses an opportunity or a capacity to engage in effective
moral action (that is to say, action that meaningfully contributes to the rectification of an injustice),
then one possesses a responsibility to do so. Opportunity to lend aid and the responsibility to do
so thus go hand-in-hand, and it is this sort of relationship between agents that we should be
concerned with in matters of transnational injustice. With this in mind, let us see how this account
can nevertheless incorporate the key insights gleaned from Eckenwiler’s treatment of transnational
justice.
I will begin with the latter and more obviously accommodated of Eckenwiler’s two guiding
principles. The idea that we ought to conceive of rectificatory responsibility as distinct from blame
for past wrongdoing is, I argue, readily demonstrated by the opportunity approach. Under this
approach, there is no principled reason for which blame should be tied to forward-looking
responsibility. The question of who possesses opportunities to respond to an injustice is a distinct
one and must therefore be addressed separate from the question of blame.
The more interesting question is whether the opportunity framework can accommodate
Eckenwiler’s relational focus. Eckenwiler rightly notes that our attributions of responsibility ought
to be sensitive to our connections to those who perpetuate and suffer from injustice. To put it more
concretely, Eckenwiler seems to recognize that we can possess certain duties by virtue of our roles
11
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in relation to injustices. However, Eckenwiler’s account does not adequately capture why we want
agents to discharge their role-related duties. What is it about one’s social connection to an injustice
that renders it of the utmost importance that one take responsibility for discharging the duties
associated with it? I believe this sort of sentiment to be best grounded from the perspective of
opportunities for moral action. One’s roles and relationships enter the equation due to the ways in
which they mediate or create opportunities for effective action that would not otherwise exist. In
this way, the aim of compelling agents to discharge their role-related duties ought to be an aim of
forward-looking attributions of responsibility if and only if, and because, our relationships to
certain injustices confer upon us unique opportunities for effective moral action, and compelling
individuals to perform these uniquely effective moral actions will help us to respond to injustice
most effectively. My argument, then, is not that Eckenwiler is misguided in demanding an
approach to transnational justice that recognizes the moral importance of social connections and
role-related duties, but that we ought to explain the importance of these concepts by focusing on
their capacity to bring about maximally effective responses to structural injustice by attending to
the variety of opportunities they generate.
Thus, each of the guiding principles of Eckenwiler’s account seem to be well captured
under the opportunity framework, but what of the criteria she suggests for attributing forwardlooking responsibility in the context of care worker migration?
As noted, Eckenwiler’s first suggestion is to hold those who benefit from structural
injustices responsible for rectifying them. I am especially sympathetic to this suggestion in the
case of care worker migration because the argument seems to closely track a sort of opportunityfocused reasoning. Beyond the fact that doing so accords with certain moral intuitions, Eckenwiler
additionally notes that such agents will be able to “adapt to changed circumstances without
12
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suffering serious deprivation.”32 Because the costs of discharging rectificatory duties will, for such
agents, be minimized, they are likely to be particularly effective assignees for such duties. In other
words, the mere benefitting from an injustice does not in principle demand attributing forwardlooking responsibility qua the bare fact that the agent has benefitted. Rather, the fact that a given
agent benefits from an injustice entails that such an agent possesses a unique opportunity to lend
aid. This is because a benefitting agent is likely connected to the structural injustice in a way that
allows that person to respond without sustaining serious harm or ‘deprivation’. Given that certain
agents have already benefitted from the structural injustices of care worker migration, especially
economically, they are thereby better situated than others to bear the costs of a moral response to
the injustice, particularly if the response demands funding.33 What is important to note, however,
is that high-income countries, for instance, possess this sort of responsibility only because the
benefits of importing low-cost workers have made them particularly capable of responding with
financial contributions. Thus, by situating Eckenwiler’s account in an opportunity framework, we
can still make sense of her suggestion that those who benefit possess special obligations to rectify
injustice, but we can better explain why this is the case by appealing to the opportunity for effective
response that this connection affords.
The second suggestion made by Eckenwiler is that any agent who participates in the
structures that contribute to injustice ought thereby to possess a responsibility to rectify it.34 Again,
I believe the sentiment underlying Eckenwiler’s claim here is highly plausible. Namely, the nature
of our relationships and roles within international structures and institutions will be of the utmost
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importance in assessing how we ought to understand our responsibilities for rectifying an
injustice.35 However, it behooves us to once again consider why this might be the case. I suggest
that it is because of the way our relationships and roles, especially those that are participatory or
contributory in nature, afford us unique sorts of opportunities for aid. Alternatively, our
relationships to others give rise to duties of care and concern that need not be grounded in any sort
of causal contribution to an injustice or harm. It is simply by virtue of the opportunities for effective
moral response that relationships to injustice may admit of forward-looking responsibility and
corresponding obligations thus arise.36 To be sure, it is no doubt the case that one’s causal history
will be relevant to determining one’s opportunities for effective moral action and so we need not
discount Eckenwiler’s suggestion entirely. Assigning responsibility on the basis of causal
contributions can be an effective way of rectifying injustice because those who have participated
in, or contributed to, a structural injustice are likely to be in a privileged position with respect to
the power to dismantle the relevant structures.
In short, the opportunity-focused perspective holds that if one of the goals of forwardlooking attributions of responsibility is to produce the most effective outcome in rectifying an
injustice, it is entirely conceivable that there are relationships beyond benefit or
participation/contribution that will give rise to opportunities for effective moral action. While
Eckenwiler’s account rightly identifies two particular sorts of relationships as responsibility
generating, the opportunity-focused account extends the scope of legitimate attributions of

Lisa Eckenwiler, “Care Worker Migration and Transnational Justice,” 176.
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responsibility to any and all parties for whom there exists the opportunity for effective moral
response.
In practice then, adopting the proposed framework will look something like the following
sketch. We begin by examining the relations of varying agents to the injustice at hand such as
benefit, participation, contribution, geographic location, or epistemic privilege. By examining
these relations, we are given a strong starting point from which to assess opportunities for moral
response and the most effective ways to acknowledge and rectify the structural injustices of care
worker migration. States which benefit financially might be well-suited to provide funding for
rectificatory efforts, NGOs with knowledge of the injustice and the structures that contribute to it
might be well-suited to coordinate the response and act as a go-between for each of the actors
involved, and qualified individuals in close geographic proximity to source countries suffering
severe shortages in health workers might be well-suited to migrate temporarily to offer relief. Each
of these relationships offers a unique opportunity that may be unavailable to agents with other sorts
of relationships. Some will aid in alleviating the causes of structural injustices and some will serve
to rectify their harmful effects. By assessing the full scope of relationships and the opportunities
corresponding to them, we are able to give a more comprehensive response to ongoing crises.
Earlier, I assessed the strength of Eckenwiler’s account on the basis of its ability to
instantiate Tronto’s proposal for the rectification of the more personal injustices faced by migrant
care workers. Now, having situated Eckenwiler’s account within an opportunity-focused
framework, I would like to return to Tronto’s proposal and demonstrate how this variation of the
account will more effectively allow us to attribute the responsibility to carry it out.
From the perspective of opportunity, then, one of the most significant connections that
must be acknowledged is one’s status as a citizen of a community wherein immigrant care workers
15
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are employed. This connection is significant whether or not one’s status as a citizen of the
community concerned confers any sort of benefit or has played any sort of contributory role in the
injustices. What is important about this connection is that it affords one a unique opportunity for
moral action, namely, to modify one’s definition of citizenship to include the contributions of care
workers and to encourage others to do so. In this way, we can begin to address attitudes regarding
care work that undermine the respect these types of workers are afforded in certain societies. By
increasing respect and recognizing the contributions of care workers as significant, we can more
readily incorporate such work into our conception of citizenship and allow these workers to be
protected by state institutions devoted to preventing exploitation. This will address not only
material issues such as the disparities in wages, working conditions, and health insurance
immigrant care workers face, but will additionally give them greater autonomy and political
equality, backed by concrete political institutions, to express their interests in the societies to which
they have migrated.
What is important to note is that one’s status as a citizen offers one a unique range of
potential moral action, just as would one’s status as a beneficiary or a contributor. Each of these
constitutes a separate social connection with distinct opportunities for moral response.
Responsibility can be conferred discretely to each of these categories to the extent that this is the
case. Scope is limited under this approach only by opportunity, not by any particular sorts of
relations. Furthermore, by appealing to citizenship as a distinct type of connection with distinct
opportunities that generate distinct responsibilities, we are more readily able to carry out this
proposal then we were with the resources of Eckenwiler’s approach. We are able to include all
citizens in the scope of responsible agents, by virtue of their citizenship, and we are able to
motivate them to do so by attending to the recognizable fact that it is their contributions as citizens
16
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to the shared conception of citizenship that gives them the opportunity to respond effectively to
the structural injustice at hand. They are motivated not by having indirectly and unrecognizably
participated in some structure of injustice, but by the fact that their concrete, recognizable political
status as citizens generates a corresponding duty to reflect on the ways in which they conceive of
citizenship and how these conceptions can harm or benefit others. In this way, inclusive scope
need not come at the cost of motivational force. Under the opportunity approach I have presented,
the scope and motivational force of such duties go hand-in-hand.

Conclusion
At the outset of the paper. I mentioned the need for a framework that is sensitive to all
moral considerations one might think relevant in determining one’s moral obligations. The
opportunity framework thus serves to explain why each of the considerations we might already
view as fundamental to assessing obligations is in fact so. Thus, economic power provides one
with opportunities to finance rectificatory efforts, to lobby international financial institutions such
as the World Bank or the IMF, and to impose sanctions on those who contribute to, or perpetuate
structural injustices against, migrant care workers. Political power provides the opportunity to
revise legislation in a way that is sensitive to the needs of non-citizen migrant care workers who
are vulnerable and away from home. Epistemic privilege provides one the opportunity to consult
with actors to find solutions that genuinely reflect the needs of those sustaining harm, rather than
the apparent needs that might be projected onto them by outside actors. In each case, a focus on
connections and the opportunities that reside therein opens the door to a more robust response.
While there is much to be gained from considering Eckenwiler’s suggestions for addressing the
structural injustices of the care worker migration crisis, there is value to thinking about these
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suggestions from the perspective of opportunities to maximize effective rectification. An
opportunity-centric framework allows us to overcome the obstacles raised by focusing on
particular types of connections by rather focusing on the opportunities all types of connections
afford.
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